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Foreword
By FRANCIS WILLIAM O'BRIEN*
INTRODUCTION
Stanley Forman Reed was born in Mason County, Ken-
tucky on December 31, 1884 and died on April 3, 1980 in
Huntington, New York at the age of ninety-five.1 He thus
lived longer than any of the other 101 justices who have
served on the United States Supreme Court. Reed served on
the Court from 1938 to 1957, and in those nineteen years he
wrote 339 opinions: 231 Court opinions, 20 concurring, and 88
dissenting opinions.2 For many years after his retirement from
the Supreme Court he continued as an active senior jurist
serving on lower federal courts.3 As he was reviewing material
for a case before an appellate court, Reed mentioned that
such work was the same as that of the Supreme Court and
that he was too rusty on trial procedure to serve on a district
court.4 On another occasion, however, he expressed enthusi-
asm for such trial court work, stating that he enjoyed having
complete run of a court.
My association with Justice Reed began about 1954, and,
during the next few years, I profited from many conversations
in his Supreme Court chambers. Most of our talks concerned
the first amendment,5 but we touched upon numerous other
* Tower-Hester Professor of Political Science, Southwestern University,
Georgetown, Texas.
1 N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1980, § A, at 23, cols. 1 & 2.
2 For these figures I am indebted to Professor Henry J. Abraham of the Univer-
sity of Virginia.
3 Reed stepped down from the Supreme Court but did not resign from the fed-
eral judiciary. The law permits justices over 70, with at least 10 years of service, to
retire at full pay, to keep their office and to accept assignments from the Chief Jus-
tice to lower courts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 294, 371 (1977).
The last recorded assignment for Reed was to the U.S. Court of Claims and was
made by Chief Justice Warren Burger for the period from November 11, 1971 to June
31, 1972. 92 S.Ct. 11 (1971).
' Interview with Justice Reed in Reed's Supreme Court chambers in Washing-
ton, D.C. (Dec. 8, 1959).
5 These conversations took place while I was preparing a book. They continued
for a time after publication of that book, entitled F. O'BRmN, JusTIcE REED AND THE
FIRST AmENE NTM : THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1958). Our correspondence gradually
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topics related to his life and judicial philosophy. This fore-
word proposes to survey such matters in a sketchy manner,
adding my personal observations where possible.
Stanley Reed's father was a wealthy physician," and his
family's financial condition afforded him a broad university
education usually reserved for the more affluent. After public
instruction in local schools, Reed received a Bachelor of Arts
degree from Kentucky Wesleyan College in 1902. In 1906 he
earned another Bachelor of Arts degree from Yale University,
where he was awarded the Bennett Prize in history. Econom-
ics. and history were his major subjects at Yale.
While Reed was at Yale, William Graham Sumner was
the University's brightest luminary in sociology and political
economy. An undisputed exponent of laissez-faire, he strongly
opposed government intervention in business matters, even
when the general welfare seemed to demand it.7 Reed com-
mented in early 1958 that Sumner had made more of an im-
pression on him than had any other Yale professor, first be-
cause of Sumner's insistence that persons of talent and
position had a duty to enter government service to assist
others and second because of his belief that each generation
could add something to improve mankind.8 Reed, of course,
spent most of his adult life in government service but never
manifested any Sumnerian influence in his public activities."
It is thus most difficult to explain Reed's praise of Sumner,
one who so adamantly opposed improvement of economic and
social conditions by government intervention. But since
Reed's statement to me was made fifty years after his days at
tapered off and then ceased about 1966.
6 For all the vital statistics, see WHO's WHO IN AMERICA 2606 (37th ed. 1972-73).
A much more detailed account is contained in Fitzgerald, Justice Reed: A Study of a
Center Judge (1950) (unpublished dissertation for a doctor's degree in political
science at the University of Chicago). See generally N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1938, at 1,
col. 1, & at 36, col. 4.
7 15 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 406 (1968).
' Interview with Justice Reed (Jan. 28, 1958). Reed somewhat sadly commented
that his two sons had not followed Sumner's first injunction: they both had turned to
private law practice.
' Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 9. Reed's long association with the Federal Farm
Board, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and finally with New Deal litigation
in the courts all deny any taint of economic laissez-faire.
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Yale, perhaps his power of recall had somewhat weakened and
the praise should really have been bestowed on some other
Yale professor.
From 1906-1909 Reed engaged in the study of law, first at
the University of Virginia and then at Columbia University.
Interestingly, at this time Harlan Fiske Stone, who was to
serve as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court during Reed's
first few years on the high bench,10 was a member of Colum-
bia's law faculty. Reed's formal education was completed be-
tween 1909 and 1910 when he attended the University of
Paris with the status of auditeur b6n6vole.
On May 11, 1908 Reed married Winifred Elgin. He was
admitted to the Kentucky bar in 1910 and began his practice
of law in his home town of Maysville. Almost immediately he
entered a campaign for the Kentucky legislature, and from
1912 to 1916 he held his only elective office as a state assem-
blyman. During these years he sponsored a child-labor law
and a workman's compensation act. In 1912 Reed attended
the Democratic National Convention in Baltimore, and, as
chairman of the Kentucky Democratic Party, he was instru-
mental in bringing Woodrow Wilson to Kentucky that year
for an important address.11 Reed had thought that Wilson
might award him a government position in Washington. He
had always wanted to locate in the capital and particularly
coveted the position of assistant attorney general. The presi-
dent, however, offered him a position as counsel for one of the
departments. 2 Reed declined, not wanting to be buried in
such a position. In 1918 he entered the United States Army
and served as a first lieutenant.13 When Fred Vinson ran for
Congress in 1922, Reed managed Vinson's campaign in one
section of his Kentucky district.14 Reed wistfully observed to
me that he had thought he might have received the nod to run
10 Beard, Prefatory Note to S. KONEFSKY, CHIEF JUSTICE STONE AND THE SUPREME
COURT at xvi (1945).
11 Interview with Justice Reed (Jan. 28, 1958).
12 Id.
13 WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA 2606 (37th ed. 1972-73); N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1980,
§ A, at 23, col. 2.
14 Interview with Justice Reed (Jan. 28, 1958). Reed served on the Court under
Chief Justice Vinson from 1946 to 1953.
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instead of Vinson, but that "it was decided otherwise. ' ' 1 l
As a lawyer in Kentucky for more than twenty-five years,
Reed gained much experience with corporation law by acting
as counsel for such large concerns as the Chesapeake & Ohio
Railroad and the Kentucky Burley Tobacco Growers Associa-
tion.l" Between 1929 and 1932 Reed served as general counsel
for the Federal Farm Board, and in December of 1932 Presi-
dent Hoover named him to the important post of general
counsel for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. 7 Reed
continued in this position during President Franklin D.
Roosevelt's administration until Roosevelt appointed him as
Solicitor General in 1935.8 As Solicitor General, Reed repre-
sented the United States government before the Supreme
Court in a number of leading cases involving New Deal legis-
lation." In 1935 he lost decisively in the case of Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States.0 Reed, however, had foreseen
the weakness of the government's position here and had
warned against testing the National Recovery Act through
this vulnerable case. 21 In 1937 the Solicitor General success-
fully persuaded a divided Court to accept the constitutionality
of the Wagner Labor Act in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,22 thereby winning a victory for the government in its
attempts to implement New Deal legislation.
By this time Reed had proven that he was a highly-quali-
fied lawyer as well as a devoted supporter of the New Deal.2 3
15 Id.
" N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1980, § A, at 23, col. 2; Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 11-17.
17 Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 17.
" N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1935, at 9, col. 2.
" N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1938, at 1, col. 2; 59 REPORT OF N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N
431-33 (1936).
20 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
21 See Reed's correspondence with Roosevelt, as reported on in C. LEONARD, A
SEARCH FOR A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION OF 1937, at 66 (1971). Perhaps it is more correct to say that Reed would
have preferred that the government had never prosecuted the Schechter brothers in
the first place.
22 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
23 High praise came from Attorney General Horace S. Cummings when testifying
at Senate committee hearings. N.Y. Times, Jan. 21, 1938, at 3, col. 3. For a discussion
of the enthusiasm of the bar on Reed's nomination to the Court, see C. CURTIS, LIONS
UNDER THE THRONE 193 (1947).
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He was accepted universally as a supporter of liberal eco-
nomic government programs and as a broad constructionist of
the Constitution.24 He was not, however, an exponent of radi-
cal views but was rather a civil and urbane realist convinced
that the Constitution suffered no violence when properly ad-
justed to meet problems not anticipated by the founding
fathers.
In January of 1938 Justice George Sutherland resigned
from the Supreme Court; Roosevelt immediately named Reed
as his successor. 25 There was general euphoria over his nomi-
nation, and he easily won confirmation on January 25.26 Dur-
ing the previous summer, Reed had been a logical choice to
succeed Justice Willis Van Devanter when he vacated his seat
on the bench. But, as many acute observers at the time cor-
rectly perceived, Stanley Reed was not very aggressive, and as
his first appointment to the Supreme Court Roosevelt wanted
a "militant.' 2 7 Roosevelt found such a nominee in the fighting
New Deal Senator from Alabama, Hugo F. Black.
Soon after Reed's confirmation, the Court began to ad-
dress cases involving first amendment liberties, criminal pro-
cedural guarantees and civil rights for blacks. In the postwar
period, provocative constitutional questions were raised about
how best to combat Communism in the United States. The
Supreme Court was sharply divided over these and allied sub-
jects. In 1953 Carl Brent Swisher, then professor at Johns
Hopkins, wrote: "In a group of nine in which many were high-
ly controversial characters, Justice Reed remained largely un-
controversial.... [H]e wrote opinions conventionally as a
justice and not as a crusader for particular theories or prac-
tices. In public observation he remained a quiet figure while
controversy raged around him. .... 3"28
24 N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1938, at 36, col 2.
15 Id. at col. 1. That both Hoover and Roosevelt found responsible posts in their
administrations for such a person speaks well for the man and his philosophy of gov-
ernment. Additionally, his nomination to the Court won wide acclaim from both par-
ties. Id. 0
26 Id. See H. ABRAHAM, JUsTICES AND PRESIDENTs 204 (1974).
17 N.Y. Times, Aug. 15, 1937, § 4 (Editorials), at 3, col. 1. This is clearly sug-
gested by H. ABRAHAm, supra note 26, at 200.
28 C. SwisHER, AEmRucAN CONsTrruTIONA DEVELOPMENT 1066 (2d ed. 1954). Of
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I. JUSTICE REED AND CIvIL RIGHTS
Reed, however, did not escape the shafts and scorns of
many Court critics who manifested disappointment that the
liberal New Dealer established a rather conservative voting
record in the area of civil liberties.29 Admittedly, the words
"liberal" and "conservative" are inexact terms in any political
lexicon. Most frequently, however, a judge is categorized as
liberal if in civil rights cases he votes to uphold the claims of
individuals in confrontation with the omnipotent state. A
judge disposed to support the government is frequently la-
beled as a conservative.30
In 1948 one Court follower wrote that Reed, Jackson,
Burton and Vinson were considered "the civil liberties lag-
gards on the Court," but he qualified this statement by ad-
ding that they were "far indeed from being Rankins or Gerald
Smiths."'31 About the same time another writer penned these
words: "The subject on which Reed hit his literary high is
treatment of Jehovah's Witnesses, an issue on which he gener-
ally upholds local ordinances against the religious sect."32
When Reed resigned from the Court, the New York
Times carried an editorial of high praise, but nonetheless it
referred to him as a member of "the more conservative group
on the Supreme Court bench.13 3 On the same occasion, Arthur
Krock preferred to call him a "moderate progressive. '"" Krock
observed that in the previous nineteen years the Court had
the many former clerks of Justice Reed whom I have interviewed, none ever had an
unkind word to utter about this "parfit gentil knyght," but several spoke of his dis-
like of "theories." Harold Leventhal, for instance, wrote me that "he has limited facil-
ity for abstract theory or doctrine .... He avoids 'absolutes' for more than one rea-
son-but that lack of facility is part of what breeds that mistrust." Letter from
Harold Leventhal to Francis William O'Brien (June 24, 1957). See text accompanying
note 93 infra for further evidence of this attitude.
219 See, e.g., W. MCCUNE, THE NINE YOUNG MEN 66 (1947); C. PRrrcCH=r, THE
ROOSEVELT COURT 131, 141, 190, 226 (1948); F. RODELL, NINE MEN 268 (1955); Frank,
The United States Supreme Court: 1950-51, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 222-23 (1952).
30 O'BRIEN, supra note 5, at 197-98.
11 Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947-48, 16 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 33
(1948).
3' W. McCUNE, supra note 29, at 65.
33 N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1957, at 24, col. 2.
3' Id. at col. 5.
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moved "from conservative to radical, from radical to moderate
and from moderate to radical again-while he had followed
the line of legal reasoning he brought to the high bench."35
Speaking of Reed's early years on the Court, Krock wrote:
Reed felt at home with the new majority, and his deviations
by dissent were only when, with Hughes, Brandeis, Stone or
Roberts-like himself lawyers of deep experience-he could
not go along with what he considered the judge-made
amendments of the Constitution implicit in the opinions of
Black, Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas and Frank
Murphy .... 36
This was an over-generalization, but Court historians will per-
ceive in it more than a modicum of truth. The belief that
Reed was a conservative in civil rights matters has persisted
in many circles, a belief reflected in Facts on File, which in its
summary announcement of Reed's death said that he "was
noted for his support of New Deal legislation and his re-
strained view of civil liberties. .... ,,37
Reed often appeared to be disturbed by such characteri-
zations. On one visit to his chambers,38 I brought in a book
whose dust jacket carried the observation that Reed had
turned conservative on the bench. The justice reacted ad-
versely, stating he could not figure out the reasoning of such
critics. He immediately brought up the case of Brown v.
Board of Education39 and strongly protested reports that he
had been the most reluctant of the nine in that case. Several
responsible sources indicated that both Reed and Frankfurter
originally had decided to dissent, only to be dissuaded from
such action by the persuasive Chief Justice Earl Warren. Reed
scoffed at the whole idea, observing that a simple perusal of
earlier decisions should have convinced anyone that the
Brown ruling was inevitable.40 Bringing forth volumes of the
11 N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1957, § 4 (Editorials), at 3, col. 2.
6 Id.
3 Facts on File, May 9, 1980, at 360, col. 3.
38 Interview with Justice Reed (Jan. 28, 1958).
31 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
40 Interview with Justice Reed (Jan. 28, 1958). See R. BURGER, GOVERNMENT BY
JUDIcIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 118-33, 342 (1977),
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United States Reports, Reed pointed to his majority opinion
in Smith v. Allwright,4 1 which outlawed the white primary.
With equal pride he opened a volume to his opinion for the
Court in Morgan v. Virginia,42 which struck down state laws
requiring segregated seating of passengers on interstate buses.
II. JUSTICE REED AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Reed always manifested his greatest air of triumph when
he discussed his dissent in McCollum v. Board of Education4 3
in which eight members of the Court struck down a program
in Champaign, Illinois that allowed school classrooms to be
used one-half hour a week by ministers of religion for the in-
struction of children whose parents had so requested. Reed
simply could not detect the slightest infringement of religious
freedom,44 and thought historical practices as old as the na-
tion itself proved that the program in no way impinged ad-
versely on the establishment clause of the first amendment."
On both points he had the support of many knowledgeable
constitutional law scholars.46 As for his own mail, Reed con-
where the author wrote only of Justices Jackson and Frankfurter as being strongly
hesitant about justifying the 1954 decision by use of the 1868 amendment. He merely
refers to Reed as one of four "probable dissenters if the Court voted to overturn
Plessy in the spring of 1953." Id. at 128 (quoting R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976)).
One clerk confided that Reed was weeping as the justices left the bench after
Warren delivered the Brown opinion.
41 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
42 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
4. 333 U.S. 203, 238 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting).
44 Id. at 240-41.
41 Id. at 244. Here, as in other places in his dissenting opinion, Reed relied heav-
ily on Jefferson and Madison for a contemporary interpretation of the "establish-
ment" clause.
Frequently I would find Reed deep in the volumes of the Congressional Record
or some other early documents to learn what the original drafters had intended by
some statute or constitutional provision. Part of Reed's judicial philosophy was cap-
tured by Frankfurter when he wrote: "[A]n amendment to the Constitution should be
read in a 'sense most obvious to the common understanding at the time of its adop-
tion.'" Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
" E.g., Corwin, The Supreme Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 3 (1949); Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CH. L.
REV. 426 (1953); Meiklejohn, Educational Cooperation Between Church and State,
14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 61 (1949); Meyer, The Blaine Amendment and the Bill of
Rights, 64 HARV. L. REv. 939 (1951); Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAw & CoN-
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fided that no opinion had ever won for him such a number of
favorable letters--"ten times more than any other.
4 7
In 1951 the Court apparently reassessed its McCollum
position and virtually reversed itself in Zorach V. Clauson.48
Reed once bluntly commented that "the Court simply
adopted the McCollum dissent." 49 There is no justification for
those critics disposed to catalogue Reed's votes in these cases
as illiberal. On the contrary, his votes clearly seem to be victo-
ries for religious freedom, for an unbiased reading of history
and for judicial restraint in an area of parental rights where
such restraint is clearly proper.
Did Reed manifest a want of liberalism in cases involving
freedom of speech and the freedom to distribute religious
literature? It is impossible to analyze here the multitude of
such cases, with all their varied subtleties, which demanded
his scrutiny. Still, a general review of the Jehovah's Witnesses
cases and their progeny which the Court reviewed during his
tenure is enlightening as to Reed's stance on these first
amendment issues. In the two flag-salute cases,50 Reed voted
TEMP. PROB. 23 (1949).
"" Interview with Justice Reed (Dec. 2, 1955).
48 434 U.S. 306 (1952). There was this difference from the McCollum case: in the
New York plan no religion class was held on school property; children were simply
released from a regular class period to take instruction at their own churches. But the
dissenting Justices, Black, Frankfurter and Jackson, saw no significant difference al-
lowing escape from the "no aid" principle on which the McCollum ruling was
grounded. Id. at 315, 320, 323. This principle was first stated in Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947), in which the Court found no violation of the first and
fourteenth amendments in providing transportation for children by public buses to
parochial schools. Reed, of course, had never accepted this principle.
40 Interview with Justice Reed (Dec. 2, 1955).
W0 est Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 586 (1943); Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). In Barnette, Frankfurter wrote a long
dissenting opinion which defended the school board's right to demand the flag-salute.
319 U.S. at 646-71. Reed and Roberts did not join in this opinion, although they also
dissented from the Court's decision against the compulsory salute on grounds set
forth in the Court's opinion in Minersville. 310 U.S. at 642-43.
Reed once remarked that he had not joined Frankfurter's dissent in the 1943
flag-salute case because of Frankfurter's words denying the "preferred position" doc-
trine and because of his statements on Jews. Interview with Justice Reed (Dec. 2,
1955). Justice Frank Murphy tried to get Frankfurter to omit his reference to Jews as
being too personal and therefore improper for a Court opinion. J. LASH, FROM THE
DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 254 (1975).
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to sustain a school board and a state law against the Wit-
nesses' protests that this gesture of patriotism violated their
interpretation of the Bible. Thus, it would appear that here
Reed did not display a proper regard for the legitimate claims
of religious conscience.
The largest number of cases brought to the Court by this
sect, however, touched upon the rights asserted by its mem-
bers to distribute literature on the streets or in private homes
or to preach in public places without permits from local au-
thorities.5 ' Not until 1942 did Reed begin to vote consistently
against the rights asserted. His opinions merit close reading,
for they are generally carefully reasoned and do not bear the
stamp of a narrow spirit. In so doing, readers should keep in
mind that Reed was always a man of pronounced civilities
who believed that even constitutional rights should be exer-
cised only with proper regard for the legitimate claims of the
general public. The Witnesses, on the other hand, frequently
pursued their apostolic mission-at least at that time-with
untoward aggressiveness and in ways highly offensive to mem-
bers of other sects.5 2 This fact may well have predisposed the
genteel Reed to look benignly on the restrictions imposed on
the Witnesses by public officials.
In Saia v. New York,53 Frankfurter, Reed, Burton and
Jackson dissented when the court invalidated a city ordinance
prohibiting sound amplifiers in public places without permis-
sion of the chief of police. The dissenters may have been the
real liberals in this case. The dissenters wrote that the "appel-
lant's loudspeakers blared forth in a small park in a small
city"54 and that the ordinance was a reasonable safeguard of
"the rights of others not to be assailed by intrusive noise." 55
In a separate dissent, Justice Jackson stated more bluntly
that the Court's decision seemed "to endanger the great right
51 It has been reported that the Witnesses brought 45 cases to the Supreme
Court. 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, Jehovah's Witnesses 11 (1980). Because of space
limitations only a limited number of the more significant cases will be cited below.
82 See 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Jehovah's Witnesses 131 (15th ed. 1978).
53 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting, with Reed, J., and Bur-
ton, J., concurring).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 563.
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of free speech by making it ridiculous and obnoxious." '
Kovacs v. Cooper57 did not concern religious speech but
did involve actions not unlike those in the Witnesses cases.
Reed's opinion upheld a city ban against use of "loud and rau-
cous" amplifiers on streets and public places. He admitted to
me that his Kovacs opinion was not free from weaknesses, but
he asserted that "Saia had to be undone."58 In Martin v. City
of Struthers," he dissented when the Court reversed the con-
viction of certain Witnesses who in violation of a city ordi-
nance knocked on strangers' doors and rang doorbells to dis-
tribute religious literature. In Breard v. Alexandria,6" Reed
penned the majority opinion upholding a city ordinance that
prevented uninvited vendors of merchandise and magazines
from visiting private homes. He wrote that the ordinance sim-
ply prohibited "opportunists" from "crushing the living rights
of others to privacy and repose."61
Reed's dissent in Marsh v. Alabama 2 protested the ma-
jority's ruling that a privately-owned town could not close its
streets to the distributors of literature. Mrs. Marsh was a Je-
hovah's Witness. Reed argued that the decision implied that
private property in general could be commandeered for any
religious purpose. 3 In 1946 he joined the dissenters in Tucker
" Id. at 566.
'7 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
Interview with Justice Reed (Dec. 3, 1955). Reed stated that he was virtually
forced to write an ambiguous opinion to win over a majority for a decision that would
help control a highly disturbing problem for many cities. Id. Saia was not technically
overruled, but Kovacs did give authorities powers which Saia denied them. Corwin
wrote "so much the better" if Kovacs overruled Saia. Corwin, supra note 46, at 8
n.23a.
89 319 U.S. 141, 154 (1943) (Reed, J., dissenting). For Justice Jackson's dissent-
ing opinion with its references to the Witnesses' provocative activities, see 319 U.S. at
166, 171.
60 341 U.S. 622 (1951). Here religion was no issue. Breard was not a Jehovah's
Witness.
61 Id. at 625-26.
62 326 U.S. 501, 511 (1946) (Reed, J., dissenting). Reed confided that he felt quite
deeply over the implications of the Marsh ruling if considered from the principles of
"our type of capitalism." Interview with Justice Reed (Dec. 2, 1955).
63 326 U.S. at 514-15. In picketing cases, Reed was generally in step with the full
court from 1940 to 1950. A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 840-42 (5th ed. 1976). But in International Bhd. of Team-
sters Local 309 v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 481 (1950), Reed, Black and Minton dissented
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v. Texas,6 4 a similar case involving a federally-owned village
managed by the Federal Public Housing Authority. Reed may
have been too restrained in not extending first amendment
freedoms to persons such as Tucker, but he did sound a rea-
sonable alarm to the dangers lurking in the theory of "state
action" as it relates to private property.6 5 Recent disenchant-
ment with big government and concern over the intrusions of
oppressive governmental bureaucracy might well reinforce
many of Reed's premonitions."
Several commentators have written that Reed's decisions
defied prediction, implying that his voting record lacked con-
sistency.17 Reed clearly was not a crusader for any particular
cause or theory; he often observed that he simply looked at
the facts in a controversy and decided the case on its own
merits. An excellent example of this approach is Terminiello
v. Chicago,8 which involved a monger of hate and racism who
gave a highly inflammatory speech to persons of similar senti-
ments assembled in a Chicago auditorium. Outside the audito-
rium a huge and turbulent crowd protested in a most vigorous
fashion. Subsequently, Terminiello was convicted of disor-
derly conduct under a "breach of the peace" statute.6 9 Reed
joined the majority in a five to four decision reversing the con-
viction. The New York Times wrote with evident surprise that
"the Court's 'middle-of-the roader'" was responsible for the
from a decision against "peaceful publicity, not enmeshed in a pattern of violence."
Id. at 481. The issues involved in cases such as Marsh and Saia were not present in
that case.
64 326 U.S. 517, 521 (Stone, C.J., Reed, J., and Burton, J., dissenting).
61 In an earlier California case, certain Jehovah's Witnesses insisted on their
"constitutional" right to invade a hotel on Sunday morning and arouse the sleeping
guests. They lost in People v. Vaughn, 150 P.2d 964 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct.
1944).
" The current "rights" explosion, with even children bringing suits against par-
ents, may well have its roots in the 1940's when the Court gave strong encouragement
to many people by granting certiorari improvidently when the issue posed should
have been settled in some other forum.
67 "Reed's decisions often defied prediction ... " Facts on File, May 9, 1980, at
360, col. 3. The New York Times obituary said that "his voting record often con-
founded critics. . . ." N.Y. Times, Apr. 4, 1980, § A, at 23, col. 1.
G8 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
69 Id.
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narrow pro-speech vote.7 0 Although Reed's vote in Termi-
niello appeared to diverge from his previous pronouncements
on the first amendment, there actually was no inconsistency.
No one was compelled to hear Terminiello's offensive and ob-
noxious words; the auditorium was filled with willing listeners
only. In the previous cases, however, there was either an inva-
sion of privacy or some measure of compulsion of others on
the streets.
In the 1941 case of Bridges v. California,7 1 Reed joined
Black's five to four opinion that reversed the contempt of
court convictions of the Los Angeles Times-Mirror and of a
powerful union leader. In 1946, in Pennekamp v. Florida,2
Reed wrote the unanimous Court opinion reversing the Miami
Herald's conviction for contempt of court based upon its edi-
torials critical of the administration of justice by a Florida
court. Both of these decisions stretched freedom of the press
to rather extreme lengths in order to protect actions that
might easily have intimidated judges and resulted in miscar-
riages of justice. In neither instance, however, was there a pri-
vacy issue similar to that involved in cases like Martin v. City
of Struthers.7 3 In the 1952 case of Beauharnais v. Illinois,74
Reed dissented when five justices voted to uphold a state
group libel statute.75 Here he showed practical realism in de-
termining that the words in the statute--"virtue," "derision,"
70 N.Y. Times, May 22, 1949, § 4 (Editorials), at 1, col. 7.
71 314 U.S. 252 (1941). On November 15, 1946, Frankfurter wrote:
Stanley was counsel for the B. & 0. Railroad and other big concerns, and
... when he was appointed to the Court there was a prophecy that he
would be a conservative .... I think he is going whole hog in these cases
just to refute folk who thought he was going to be conservative.
J. LASH, supra note 50, at 288. Here Frankfurter does not mention the Bridges case,
but he probably had it in mind.
But see Reed's majority opinion, upholding an injunction against violent picket-
ing by union members, in United Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
72 328 U.S. 331 (1946). Here the editorials did not impact upon the peace or
privacy of the public or of individuals but only upon judges, and Reed opined that
men of the robe had sufficient "fortitude" to resist such influence, negating any possi-
bility of a "clear and present danger" to the fair administration of justice. Id. at 349.
73 319 U.S. at 141.
7' 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
75 Id. at 277 (Reed, J., dissenting).
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and "obloquy"-were too vague to guarantee equitable
application. 8
III. THE PLURALIST JUSTICE REED
When Reed retired from the high bench he did so merely
because he felt he no longer could do the kind of personal and
careful research to which he had been accustomed. Mrs. Reed
expressed to me her disappointment in her failure to persuade
her husband that he was well equipped to continue to serve if
he simply relied upon his many years of study and experience.
Her husband dissented.1 7
On November 7, 1957, President Eisenhower nominated
Reed to be chairman of the recently created Commission on
Civil Rights.78 As a universally respected Southerner, Reed
seemed the perfect choice for such a post, but on November
15 he reversed his initial acceptance. 9 He stated that he had
not retired from the federal judiciary and would still accept
assignments to lower courts. Accepting the post, Reed
thought, might cause disrespect for the judicial system.80 Pri-
vately, Reed frankly admitted that he felt he was the ideal
man for the position but that some people had predicted diffi-
culty in his winning confirmation because of his anti-segrega-
tion vote in the Brown case, although Reed denied that any
problem would arise. 81 He quoted a much admired lawyer who
had told him, "You were wrong both times, when you took the
job and when you resigned. '82
In conversations with Reed, I once expressed an opinion
that Chief Justice Warren had been led along the liberal path
by Justice Black. Reed, however, disagreed, observing that
" Id. at 283.
7' Reed often remarked that he liked to do his own research whenever possible.
He seemed to relish law journal articles, doctoral dissertations and any kind of docu-
ments that explored the original meaning of the Bill of Rights.
11 N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1957, at 1, col. 1. The Commission was established as a
fact-finding body for civil rights matters. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-
315, § 104, 71 Stat. 635 (1957).
71 N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1957, at 4, col. 3.
80 Id.
"1 Interview with Justice Reed (Jan. 28, 1957).
82 Id.
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Warren did not need any persuasion for he had always es-
poused the liberal cause. 8 He then remarked that Warren had
done much better than "we expected" and had displayed a
surprising grasp of legal philosophy for one with such a lim-
ited legal background, adding that "he is a good administrator
and runs his court. 84
Reed was never a gossiper and he seldom if ever spoke an
uncomplimentary word about his brethren. As Professor
Swisher once wrote, "he engaged but little in the jibes at the
beliefs and performances of other justices which characterized
the performances of some of his colleagues."8 5 As for the much
reported Black-Jackson feud, Reed remarked that he had
hardly known the feud existed.86 He did add a general obser-
vation about Jackson, saying that "his expression was better
than his thought and that he would rather show a fine phrase
than depth or perfect correctness. ' 87 Such a remark was in
keeping with the personality of the non-flamboyant Justice
Reed who never himself strived for any colorful rhetoric. Re-
garding Chief Justice Fred Vinson, Reed opined that he had
been underrated, that he had been a good lawyer with a fine
memory for names, "even foreign" ones, a talent that "ingrati-
ated him with all.""
Reed was clearly proud to have served under four chief
justices, but Hughes was definitely his ideal. He said that
Hughes was stately in appearance, gifted with an excellent
memory, persuasive in conference and so exacting that "you
had to be sure of your ground if you ever challenged him."89
Reed remarked that as Solicitor General, he had by custom
visited each justice at the beginning and end of each term.90
83 Id. When I remarked upon the evangelical vigor with which Black read his
opinions from the bench, Reed replied that he was quite different in conferences.
Apparently he meant that Black listened patiently and accepted the reasonableness
of the opinions of his brethern.
84 Id.
85 C. SWISHER, supra note 28, at 1066.
" Interview with Justice Reed (Jan. 28, 1957).
87 Id. It should be noted that Jackson had been dead five years when Reed made
this remark.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
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On one such visit to Hughes in 1937, at the time of the
"Court-packing" plan, the Chief Justice warned him not to be
misled by reports that Justice Willis Van Devanter was not
doing his share of the work on the bench.91 Hughes assured
Reed that Van Devanter was an expert on procedure and said
that for every case he presented the Court with a complete
study of all procedural questions involved, thus contributing
more than anyone to an easing of the justices' burdens. 2
In 1955 1 attempted to discern a pattern in Justice Reed's
varied opinions and voting record. Upon entering Reed's Su-
preme Court chambers, I announced to Reed my conclusion
that he was a pluralist. The response, uttered in a clear flat
tone, was "I don't like it."93 This was consistent with Reed's
dislike and suspicion of doctrinaire theories and of sophisti-
cated political jargon. Upon my asking permission to read him
a portion of my manuscript, Reed agreed, stating that he
would challenge only factual errors, not opinions. After I had
read him the manuscript, Reed's expression remained un-
changed, but I sensed that he was quite happy with the analy-
ses and conclusions.94
The "pluralist" thesis includes analysis of Reed's early
years in Kentucky when he worked with farm co-operatives,
thus gaining the experience which, in 1929, prompted Hoover
to name him general counsel for the Federal Farm Board. In
that position he became associated with marketing co-opera-
tives on a national scale. His work as general counsel for the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation helped confirm his belief
that individuals could become economic beneficiaries if affili-
ated with organizations nurtured by government aid. As Solic-
itor General he defended federal programs premised on a
faith that government should help rehabilitate industries
without sacrificing their self-government; notably, the produc-
tion codes were written and enforced by representatives of the
industries themselves. In 1937, with Reed arguing as Solicitor
General, the Court awarded labor its greatest triumph in up-
01 Id.
92 Id.
93 Interview with Justice Reed (Dec. 2, 1955).
94 Id.
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holding a law protecting the right of workers to organize and
to bargain collectively.95 Thus, Reed had for years been repu-
diating economic laissez-faire, whether espoused by individ-
ual businesses or by individual workers.
On the Court, Reed was wary of laissez-faire even in the
area of civil rights, as many of his opinions reviewed above
seem to demonstrate. In these cases he defended local school
boards, city councils and state legislatures against restive indi-
viduals claiming unusual personal rights under the first
amendment. He was inclined to look beyond the particular
claimant in court to the rights of the thousands of individuals
whose voices could not be individually raised but who had to
rely on the voice of the government attorney. In 1947, in
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 96 a challenge to a federal
law put the issue squarely before the justices. The Hatch Act"2
prohibited government employees from active participation in
political campaigns. Naturally there were a number of robust
spirits who yearned to do active combat in the political arena.
Reed's majority opinion, however, defended the right of the
nation as a whole to protect the democratic process from per-
nicious influences. It also protected hundreds of thousands of
other government workers from the importunate and danger-
ous "requests" of unscrupulous politicians for campaign con-
tributions as well as for other visible displays of personal
support.
In some cases Reed may have been overly disposed to
protect the group and not sufficiently alert to the legitimate
concerns of the truly oppressed individual. But in a complex
and diverse society like America, an all-pervasive structure of
federal government seems imperative. When highly conten-
tious speech and exotic manifestations of religion are the is-
sues, compromise and accommodation at local levels are ur-
Il NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 1.
96 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Reed's "pluralism" also seems clearly discernible in
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952). But William B. Rogers, Reed's
clerk in 1958, "participated in the writing of this opinion" and assured me that in his
personal view, the right defended was a "personal" not a "corporate one." He stated,
however, that this was not necessarily Reed's view. Letter from William B. Rogers to
Francis W. O'Brien (May 15, 1957).
97 Hatch Act, ch. 640, 54 Stat. 767 (1940).
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gently needed. This demands decision-making by groups or
small government units. To deny the ability to do so would be
an abridgement of democracy-a confession of public incom-
petence in one of the most vital areas of law-making activity.
If it seems that only by contrived artifices can Reed be
classified as a pluralist, 8 there is abundant evidence that he
at least generally manifested a salutary respect for federalism,
separation of powers, group or collective activity and judicial
restraint. On May 9, 1956, several weeks after Reed had him-
self read over the author's exposition on pluralism, he sent
this brief handwritten note: "Thank you for the opportunity
of reading the outline of your thesis. It is interesting to see
what an intelligent scholar finds and thinks about on reading
one's own work. You have helped me a lot in my own think-
ing. I like the thesis.""" On February 24, 1958, shortly after
the publication of the author's book,100 Reed sent another
handwritten letter. He said in part:
I have now read your book from cover to cover .... A
judge finds little time to chart his opinions by a definite ju-
dicial base line. When later the opinions are examined as a
whole the general trend appears. Unfortunately, the opin-
ions are not always consistent with a settled judicial philoso-
phy. I see their deficiencies from your analysis. Thank you
for your kindliness. 101
Much more could be said about this recently departed pa-
triarch of the federal judiciary. Perhaps, however, it is best to
conclude at this point merely by quoting the words of the
respected Edward S. Corwin, for many years the highly re-
nowned professor of constitutional law at Princeton and a
person universally known as "Mr. Constitution" because of
his profound knowledge of that venerable document. His let-
8 Others besides this author have detected a tinge of pluralism in some of
Reed's opinions and votes. See, e.g., Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term-
Foreward: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARv. L. REv. 91-95
(1953); Fitzgerald, supra note 6, at 382 (writing that in personal liberty cases, "Reed's
legal and administrative background has been primarily concerned with fostering
group and regional causes rather than individual causes").
" Letter from Justice Stanley Reed to Francis W. O'Brien (May 9, 1956).
F. O'BRIEN, supra note 5.
"0' Letter from Justice Stanley Reed to Francis W. O'Brien (Feb. 24, 1958).
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ter of May 16, 1957, penned after reading the author's article
on pluralism,0 2 contained this comment on Mr. Justice Reed:
"I greatly regretted his retirement from the court because he
has seemed to me for some years back the balance wheel of
that sometimes pretty complicated machine. In other words,
besides learning and broad experience, he had a level head
and was never sport [sic] of preconceptions and
prepossessions."10 3
102 O'Brien, Mr. Justice Reed and Democratic Pluralism, 45 GEO. L.J. 364
(1957). This article reviewed cases in a number of different areas. For Reed's own
words of warning against excessive judicial activism, see his "A Constitutional Philos-
ophy." Address by Justice Reed before the Juristic Society, Philadelphia (Feb. 16,
1950). Pertinent sections are reprinted in F. O'BRmN, supra note 5, at 232-34.
13 Letter from Edward S. Corwin to Francis W. O'Brien (May 16, 1957).
In 1970 some 65 law school deans, professors of law, history and political science
were polled on Supreme Court justices. Justice Reed was rated among the 55 "aver-
age" justices since 1789. H. ABRAHAM, supra note 26, at 289-90. The poll did not
indicate whether or not Reed rated in the high brackets of the "average."
Of the twelve justices rated "great," seven had been on the bench with Reed:
Hughes, Brandeis, Stone, Cardozo, Black, Frankfurter and Warren. Of the fifteen
"near greats," Reed served with five: Douglas, Jackson, Rutledge, Harlan II and
Brennan. It is by no means improbable that Reed might be assessed differently by a
panel of people such as Professor Corwin and his progeny in 1981.
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